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OPINION OF THE COURT
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Edward Fermaint Caraballo appeals from an order denying his motion to
suppress evidence.  We will affirm.
I.
Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Richard Houk pulled over for speeding a van in
which Caraballo was a passenger.  Trooper Houk requested that the driver, Gilbert Soto,
produce his driver’s license and registration.  Because Soto had a California license and
the car was registered to a New York resident, Trooper Houk inquired about the
ownership of the van and the driver’s travel plans.  Caraballo answered that the van
belonged to his aunt in New York.  He further explained that she had driven the vehicle
3from New York to California and flown back, and he was driving it back to New York to
see a doctor for a gun-shot wound and would later fly back to California. 
Returning to his patrol car to write a citation, Trooper Houk visually inspected the
exterior of the van and noticed a hidden compartment underneath.  Because of his training
in drug interdiction and experience with drug trafficking cases, he recognized the
compartment as an aftermarket product often used to transport drugs.  Trooper Houk
called another similarly experienced trooper to the scene who also observed the
compartment.  Trooper Houk arrested Caraballo and the driver, without a warrant, for
possession of an instrument of crime, a misdemeanor in Pennsylvania.  See 18 Pa. C.S.A.
§ 907(a).  
The van was towed to the police station where it was subjected to a narcotics dog
sniff.  The dog alerted to the hidden compartment, and Trooper Houk then obtained a
search warrant to search the vehicle.  A DEA agent was called in for the search and found
twenty kilograms of cocaine.  Caraballo was again arrested and signed a waiver of rights
form, and then admitted that he was receiving payment for transporting the van to New
York.
Caraballo pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to suppress the twenty kilograms
of cocaine and his post-arrest statements.  When the District Court denied his motion, he
entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of conspiring to distribute and possessing
4with the intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846, reserving his right to appeal the suppression issues. 
II.
Caraballo makes five arguments, all of which are unpersuasive.  First, he argues
that Trooper Houk improperly expanded the traffic stop by detaining Soto and himself
and asking questions about the ownership of the van and their travel plans. 
“[Q]uestions relating to a driver’s travel plans ordinarily fall within the scope of a
traffic stop.”  United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir. 2003).  When Trooper
Houk was provided with a California driver’s license and a New York registration, it was
reasonable for him to inquire about the ownership and use of the van.  His suspicion
regarding Caraballo’s answers, along with his observation of the aftermarket
compartment, established reasonable suspicion to support the intrusion.  See United States
v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that to support a greater intrusion
unrelated to the traffic stop, a police officer must establish reasonable suspicion or
probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances known to him).
Caraballo next contends that his arrest for possession of an instrument of crime
was without probable cause and thus illegal and unconstitutional.  Caraballo’s only
support for this argument is that there is no ban on the use of aftermarket compartments
and, at the time of the arrest, the trooper did not know what the compartment was being
used for.  However, this argument fails under our “totality of the circumstances” standard. 
5See Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997).  Probable cause exists where
“the objective facts available to the officers at the time of arrest were sufficient to justify
a reasonable belief that an offense was being committed.”  United States v. Myers, 308
F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1206 (3d
Cir. 1984)).  The standard “requires more than mere suspicion; however, it does not
require that the officer have evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.”  United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Orsatti v. New
Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482-83 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Based on the circumstances at
the time of the arrest, there was probable cause for Trooper Houk to arrest Caraballo for
possessing an instrument of crime.
Third, Caraballo asserts that the post-arrest search of the van and the seizure of the
cocaine were illegal and unconstitutional.  A dog sniff is not a search and no probable
cause or reasonable suspicion is necessary to conduct it, because it is minimally intrusive
and neither requires entry nor subjects any items except contraband to police scrutiny. 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707-08 (1983).  Therefore, the dog sniff was
constitutional.  Further, the seizure of drugs was constitutional, because the warrant
obtained after the dog sniff was supported by probable cause, including the positive result
of the dog sniff.
Caraballo’s fourth argument is that Trooper Houk acted in bad faith by making an
illegal and unconstitutional detention, search, and seizure.  As discussed above, Trooper
Houk fully complied with the Constitution, and there is no evidence of bad faith.
Caraballo’s final argument is that the incriminating statements he made post-arrest
should be suppressed because they were a product of his illegal and unconstitutional
arrest.  This argument fails for two reasons: (1) there was no illegal conduct leading to his
arrest for possession of cocaine, and (2) Caraballo knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to remain silent.
III.
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying
Caraballo’s motion to suppress evidence.
